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KEEPING UP WITH THE
NEIGHBOURS? CANADIAN
RESPONSES TO 9/11 IN HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE CONTEXT©
BY REG WHITAKER*
The impact of 9/11 on Canada is assessed in
historical context, in relation to the coming of the Cold
War in the 1940s and the October 1970 Le Front de
Liberation du Quebec terrorist crisis in Quebec.
Canadian policy responses to9/11 are then considered in
the comparative context of responses from Canada's
closest neighbours, the United States and the United
Kingdom. Although to some degree, Canada can be seen
to be trying to 'keep up with the neighbours', Canadian
responses are more determined by specifically Canadian
requirements, especially the need to protect Canadian
sovereignty and economic security from the unintended
consequences of American actions.

L'impact du 11 septembre sur le Canada est 6valu4
dans le contexte historique, relativement AI'avbnement
de la Guerre froide dans les ann6es 1940 et de ]a crise
terroriste d'octobre 1970 du Front de Liberation du
Quebec au Quebec. Les r~ponses des politiques
canadiennes au 11 septembre sont alors considdr~es dana
le contexte comparatif des r~ponses des voisins les plus
proches du Canada, les ttats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni.
Mame si jusqu'A un certain point, on peut percevoir que
le Canada s'efforce de suivre ces voisins, les r~ponses
canadiennes sont davantage d6termines par les
contraintes particuliares au Canada, surtout le besoin de
prot~ger la souverainet6 canadienne et lasicurit
6conomique contre les consEquences fortuites des
d~marches amdricaines.
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To assess the impact of 9/11 on Canada, historical and comparative
perspectives are helpful. This article offers two historical precedents in
Canada, followed by some comparative context for Canada's post-9/11
actions in the experience of Canada's closest neighbours, the United States
and the United Kingdom.'

2003, R. Whitaker.
Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus, York University. Adjunct Professor of Political
Science, University of Victoria.
1 The historical sections of this paper draw freely from my article "Before September 11 - Some
History Lessons" in Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Terrorism, Law &Democracy:
How is Canada ChangingFollowing September 11? (Montr6al: les Editions Th6mis, 2002) 39-54.
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When Canada joined the war on terrorism after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the decision was not without historical precedents in
the post-war world. The Cold War, especially in its initial stages from 1945
to the early 1950s, and the October 1970 Crisis in Quebec offer two
intriguing parallels to the present situation, providing a number of useful
lessons.
I.

THE COLD WAR

In the late 1940s, Canada went to a so-called Cold War, against
Soviet Communism. Just as Canadian troops have found themselves
fighting terrorists on the front lines in Afghanistan, Canadian soldiers in the
Cold War found themselves battling Communists in Korea. Both wars
included a home front and the identification of enemies within. Both wars
involved Canada in ever closer integration with the Americans, through the
generals directing the conflicts. Both wars, especially in their initial, anxious
stages, raise issues of individual and group rights in contrast to the demands
of the community for security.
9/11 was, as many have pointed out, America's 21st century Pearl
Harbor. As such, it has compelled an immediate and aggressive American
response. The Cold War turned out to be an American-led and Americandirected conflict, but in its earliest stages it did not follow the script of
December 1941. In fact, the first public notice that the wartime alliance was
about to break down into inter-bloc rivalry and hostility came in Ottawa.
How this small, dull, rather provincial capital became the focal point for
great power conflict 'in 1945-1946 is part of Canadian mythology. Igor
Gouzenko, the first important Soviet defector, exposed a spy ring operated
by Canada's ostensible wartime ally, the ussr, exploiting the willingness of
Canadians sympathetic to Communism to betray their own country on
behalf of a higher loyalty to the Socialist motherland. Canada, it was said,
experienced a sudden wake-up call, communicated this to its allies, and
then settled in for a prolonged struggle on many fronts with the new enemy
once its senior partner, America, had taken overall charge.
The struggle lasted four decades and, for most of this time, Canada
was a very junior partner. It toiled in alliance obscurity. It very occasionally
raised a cautious criticism, only to be quickly cuffed for its temerity. But it
is important to understand that when the Gouzenko spy scandal broke, first
in secret in September 1945, and then publicly in February 1946, Canada
was, in important ways, on its own, without clear models to guide it. It
consulted and received advice from its close allies, but it had to work out
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the details for itself. Its response stamped a distinctive made-in-Canada
look on Canadian Cold War security policy.2
Once the extent of Soviet espionage and Canadian complicity had
become apparent from the documents and information Gouzenko brought
with him, the government of Canada acted with what might be called the
firm smack of Prussian command. There was a secret Order in Council,
known only to three Cabinet ministers, under the authority of the War
Measures Act3 , even though the war had been over a few weeks before

Gouzenko defected; it empowered the government to act against the
suspected spies with little or no regard for civil liberties, outside the normal
processes of the legal system. Armed with this power, the government bided
its time, consulted its allies, studied the evidence, watched the suspects, and
waited for the right moment to strike in light of the international scene.
When it did strike, in mid-February 1946, it was with a series of
dawn raids by black-leather-jacketed members of the drug squad of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), who entered Ottawa homes and
apartments without specific warrants, detained a dozen people (more
followed in the days and weeks ahead), and seized papers and documents.
The detainees were transported to the RCMP barracks, where they were
interrogated for weeks on end. The detainees were not arrested under
criminal charges, and were unrepresented by counsel; habeas corpus was
ignored. Then they were brought before a secret tribunal-a royal
Commission of Inquiry, a formidable establishment body, headed by two
Supreme Court justices- with Commission counsel being the President of
the Canadian Bar Association. They were still without legal representation.
They were told they had no choice but to answer all questions put to them,
and they were deliberately not informed that they had the right of
protection against self-incrimination; they were bullied and harried by the
Commission counsel.
The Kakaesque overtones are captured in an exchange between one
detainee, Israel Halperin (who was in fact almost certainly innocent of
espionage) and the Commissioners. When brought into the hearing room
and told he must be sworn in, he fired back: "Before you swear me, would
you mind telling me who you are?" "Well," answered one of the
Commissioners, "we are the Royal Commission appointed by the
government to investigate certain matters." "Are you empowered to use
physical intimidation?" he persisted. "Not physical intimidation, but we
2 Reg Whitaker & Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada:the Making of a National Insecurity State,
1945-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) [Cold War Canada].
3 Repealed, R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.), s. 80.
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have the power to punish you if you do not answer." The witness then
turned and tried to leave the room, but was forcibly returned to the witness
box.4
At the end of these proceedings, the Commission published a
lengthy and widely read report in which it named some two dozen persons
as spies and traitors to their country.5 The detainees were then turned over
to the courts. Charges were brought against them under various statutes,
particularly the draconian OfficialSecretsAct,6 which made communication
of classified information to a foreign power a serious offence, but did not
distinguish between information that might be damaging and information
that was harmless. This statute also laid the burden of proof upon the
accused. Despite what appeared to be a stacked deck, only about half of the
two dozen eventually charged with criminal offences as a result of the
inquiry were ever convicted. Those who had incriminated themselves before
the Commission were in all cases found guilty in court. Those who had
resisted were mainly acquitted. Nevertheless, with one exception, all those
acquitted were denied further employment with the government.
At the time, there was not a great deal of criticism of the
government's methods. Public opinion (by and large) approved the actions
taken. Important sections of elite opinion, especially within the legal
community, seemed unperturbed. In retrospect, critics have described the
treatment of the suspects as abusive of their rights and as a serious violation
of liberal democratic norms. Some have even compared Canadian
behaviour unfavourably with that of the United States. Even in the dark
days of McCarthyism, the Americans did not round up suspects before
dawn, hold and interrogate them incommunicado, and haul them before
secret tribunals which would later officially name them as traitors without
legal recourse.
These criticisms are important-I have made many of them
myself-but they do not get at the rationale for the government's methods.
Contextually, this was a pre-Charter (and pre-Bill of Rights) era, and it
followed immediately upon a war in which extraordinary state action
against dissidents--detention without trial, search and seizure, censorship,
even the forcible relocation of the entire Japanese-Canadian community
from the west coast to camps in the interior, and the confiscation of their
property-had been not only tolerated, but sanctioned by the highest
4 Supra

note 1.
5The Report of the Royal Commission Appointed Under Order in Council P.C. 411
of February 5,
1946 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946).
6
Security of InformationAct, R.S.C., 1985, c. 0-5, s. 1; 2001, c. 41, s. 25.
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authorities in the land. It is not surprising that in this context, faced with
clear evidence of espionage and betrayal of trust, the government should
have reached for the most expedient administrative method for protecting
national security. Not surprising, but unfortunate, in that a precedent was
being set for a relatively low priority on civil liberties in peacetime, albeit
the twilight peacetime of the Cold War.
There was more to the government's response than context alone.
There was a consistent pattern that ran through all of its planning and
execution with regard to how to handle the explosive spy affair. The
government wished to maintain maximum control over the story-to frame
it in the most appropriate manner-and its effects, both internal and
external. In terms familiar to today's world, the government wanted to
manage the spin. There were good reasons for this. Externally, Canada
found itself in a highly exposed position vis-dt-vis the spy affair. At a time
when the wartime alliance had not yet broken down publicly, a wrong move
by Canada might precipitate grave consequences for East-West relations.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King wanted no part of such a critical
international situation. That would be left to the big battalions of the
Americans and the British. Thus the Soviet angle of the affair was
systematically downplayed in the Commission report. Others might draw
strongly anti-Soviet lessons, but Canada would not. (Ironically, and for
similar reasons, the Soviets vented their wrath over the affair at Canada, an
altogether safer target than the United States or the United Kingdom.)
The other reason for government control of spin was domestic, and
here the wisdom of the government became apparent only later. In
downplaying the Soviet role, the government also chose to highlight the
role of Communism in subverting the loyalties of Canadians. There was
genuine shock and dismay at the evidence that some Canadians held a
higher loyalty to a foreign power, and were willing to serve that power, over
their own country. The Commission report was an attempt at public
education and public warning about the dangers of dabbling in extreme leftwing ideas. It could also be seen as an exercise inpoliticalpolicing,or setting
authoritative boundaries on permissible limits of dissent. But this could
itself be a dangerous process, spinning out of control as rivals to the party
in power sought to exploit the politics of loyalty. Without strict limits, and
outside direct supervision by the Crown, the politics of loyalty could
become divisive and socially and politically destructive.
Indeed, shortly after the Gouzenko affair had been resolved, antiCommunism in the U.S. threatened just this sort of anarchy. In 1947, the
House Committee on Un-American Activities began its Hollywood witch
hunt, and by 1950 Senator Joe McCarthy was launching his demagogic antiCommunist smear campaign that gave the English language a dark epithet:
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'McCarthyism.' Before McCarthyism had run its course by 1954, the
integrity of such institutions as the U.S. Presidency and the Army was
threatened. In 1946, the Canadian government did not foresee these
developments, but by strictly controlling the Gouzenko story and its effects,
they did pre-empt the emergence of potential Canadian McCarthys, one of
whom was no less than the leader of the opposition by 1948, George Drew,
who tried but failed to forge a demagogic anti-Communist role for himself.
There was a direct link between the Gouzenko affair and the
government of Canada's Cold War internal security policies. In its
aftermath, the security screening system was set in place for civil servants,
immigrants, refugees, and citizenship applicants. The screening system was
also extended to defence industries and even to shipping on the Great
Lakes. In all cases, the process was kept as secret as possible, with security
never being advanced as a reason for limiting a person's employment or
their admission to Canada or to citizenship. For many years, there was no
appeal process for persons denied security clearance.
There were American pressures to step up security. The Americans
were evangelical in their Cold War crusade, and from time to time thought
it necessary to nudge, or push, their allies to shape up to appropriate (i.e.,
American) standards. Sometimes they were particularly insistent upon
doing something that the Canadians deemed silly or excessive, and usually
the Canadians complied, with weary resignation, on the principle that it
would be more costly to provoke them. Yet, by and large, Cold War
security policies were made in Canada. Canadians set their own rules for
security screening and always sharply distinguished themselves from the
United States by pointedly not referring to loyalty or disloyalty, but only to
risk What distinguished the two approaches was the secrecy in which the
Canadian policy was administered, and its strict monopolization by the
executive branch of the federal government. With the exception of Quebec
under Maurice Duplessis-a distinct society before the phrase was
invented, where provincial anti-Communist laws like the Padlock law, and
provincial Red Squads operated outside federal control-it was Ottawa
that prosecuted the Cold War on the home front, and Ottawa kept its cards
well hidden. When opposition voices were raised to demand information,
Ottawa tended to respond serenely (or smugly) that it was taking care of
matters and that details were the business of the proper authorities. The
operative principle was trust us.
Witch hunts wracked McCarthy-era America at all levels of
government and throughout civil society. But not in Canada-at least, not
publicly. In point of fact, there were purges and victims. There was a witch
hunt at the National Film Board (NFB): scores of people lost their jobs and
saw their careers suffer. But unlike the witch hunt in Hollywood, there were
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few headlines and no names bandied about in the media. The government
even denied there was a purge, insisting officially that only three persons
had been removed. Behind the scenes, they gave the Security Service and
a new, purged, NFB management a blank cheque to remove persons on
suspicion. By the end, some thirty-five permanent or contract employees
were terminated or encouraged to depart before they were targeted,
although the total number could only be confirmed by documents released
under Access to Information requests many decades later. The position of
Canadian officials was that the politicization of security issues inherently
risked illiberalism, and they could point to the U.S. example as
confirmation. Some of the victims of these silent purges have different
views in retrospect. The Hollywood witch hunt resulted in blacklists and
blighted careers, but finally in the public vindication of those purged, who
have been transformed from villains in the 1950s to virtual folk heroes
decades later. The Canadian victims of the NFB purge received neither
notoriety then nor public vindication later. For better or for worse, that was
the Canadian way.
Security screening of immigrant/refugee and citizenship applicants
involved Canada in extensive and persistent application of a double
standard with regard to potential new Canadians.7 Applicants with left-wing
backgrounds or associations were security risks, while those with right-wing
backgrounds were generally welcomed as anti-Communists. This had
unfortunate implications for lax treatment of Nazi war criminals and
collaborators; this issue was later subject to a Royal Commission of Inquiry
and a special section of the Justice department that was designated for
retroactively tracking down war criminals and criminal collaborators who
had passed through the security screen. It also meant that Canada put out
the welcome mat for refugees from Communism (Hungary in 1956-1957;
Southeast Asia in the late 1970s), while making it difficult for those fleeing
right-wing violence (Chile in the 1970s, central America in the 1980s).
Apart from double political standards, Cold War immigration security
firmly established a precedent of highly state-centred procedures.
Immigration was deemed a privilege, not a right. Risk was determined by
the state, and doubt must be resolved in favour of the state, not the
individual. Moreover, procedurally, the deck was highly stacked in favour
of the Crown, with non-disclosure of evidence and exparte proceedings the
norm in deportation cases.
Security screening has been an important tool for the political
policing of Canadian society. The Security Service, first the RCMP and later
7 Reg

hVitaker, Double Standard: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (Toronto: Lester

& Orpen Dennys, 1987).
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the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSis), has routinely used
screening as an effective instrument for establishing sources within suspect
organizations: the threat of lost employment or, worse, of deportation is an
effective persuader for co-operation. As an offshoot of this, and of its
preparation of threat assessments for the government, the security service
amassed a remarkable volume of dossiers on Canadians and Canadian civil
society. When the McDonald Commission of Inquiry investigated RCMP
wrongdoing in the late 1970s, it discovered that the security service held
files on no less than 800,000 individuals and organizations-a proportion
of the population watched by the secret police that would have done credit
to some less savoury regimes abroad.8 This kind of excess drew so much
criticism that the government of Brian Mulroney in the late 1980s ordered
the closure of the Counter Subversion branch of csis, with most of its files
to be destroyed or transferred to the National Archives.
There are some general points to be made about Canada's Cold
War experience. First, when directly provoked, Canada could act with
impressive firmness and resolution. Second, while Americans might be
leading the Cold War charge, Canada was quite capable of setting and
enforcing its own stiff standards for security. Even when pushed further in
particulars than they might prefer by the Americans, Canadian Cold War
policy was essentially made-in-Canada, according to Canadian imperatives;
in the end, it was not significantly different from the Americans in content,
although it did differ in style. What was most distinctive about Canadian
Cold War security policy was its strict control by the executive branch of the
federal government, and the zeal with which the federal government
guarded its prerogatives. The federal government had responsibility for
external relations and for peace, order, and good government within
Canada. The differential, and sometimes invidious, effects of national
security on individuals and groups in Canadian society were unfortunate byproducts, but the security of the state and order in the community normally
took precedence over individual and group rights. Yet ironically, the longterm consequences were the strengthening of democratic accountability and
greater concern for the protection of rights.

8 Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the RCMP, Second Report:
Freedom and Security Under the Law , vol.1 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply & Services, 1981) at 518.
According to the 1971 census, the total population of Canada was 21,568,000: 800,000 files represent
information on more than one out of every twenty-seven Canadians.
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THE OCTOBER 1970 CRISIS

When Canada faced the aftermath of the horrific attacks of 9/11,
and the requirement to join in a new global war on terrorism, it was not
altogether lacking in historical experience in dealing with terrorists. In
October 1970, Canada faced its worst internal security crisis, when cells of
the violent separatist group, Le Front de Libdration du Qudbec (F.O)
kidnapped the British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, and kidnapped
and later murdered the Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte.
Canada was thrust at this time into a harsh global spotlight amid a rising
tide of anxiety and uncertainty at home; there were conflicting calls for
negotiating with the terrorists or for staring them down. To make matters
more difficult for the federal government, this was primarily a domestic
terrorist crisis (in spite of ineffectual attempts to link the FLQ to wider
terrorist networks or even to Communism), with potentially serious
consequences for Canada-Quebec relations. Faced with this mushrooming
crisis, Canada acted swiftly and forcefully with no regard for civil liberties.
Invoking the War Measures Act under a putative, and unproven,
apprehended insurrection, the federal government placed Quebec under
what amounted to a state of martial law. Extensive use was made of the
power to detain and interrogate without charge, without counsel, and
without habeas corpus. The media were censored and the FLQ declared a
banned organization, association with which could land someone in prison;
further, association was considered retroactively. In the aftermath of the
crisis proper, the resources of the RCMP Security Service and the Quebec
and Montreal police were mobilized to counter and negate by virtually any
means, fair or foul, the FLQ or its successors. In filling out the blank
cheques issued them, the security and police forces so exceeded their lawful
roles that their activities were subject to a series of federal and provincial
Commissions of Inquiry.
However controversial the methods employed, the result was clear
and unequivocal: the FLQ and, with it, the entire terrorist tendency of the
sovereignty movement in Quebec, was eradicated. From the early 1970s
onwards, the sovereignty field was left entirely to the legitimate, lawful, and
peaceful form of the Parti Qu6b6cois (PQ), and the contestation of
federalism to democratic elections and referenda. Indeed, in surveying the
contemporary history of terrorist movements around the world, the
Canadian experience in stopping terrorism dead in its tracks and diverting
the political energies that had helped drive the movement into
constitutional channels, stands out as a quite remarkable success story.
Timing was obviously important: the terrorist movement was crushed at an
early enough stage that its repression did not elicit any popular upsurge in
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support-as for instance with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) among the
Catholic population of Northern Ireland. Maximum force can work at
preliminary stages of the development of an insurrectionary terrorist
movement; at later stages, it may well be counterproductive, as in the
current morass of death and retribution in which Israel finds itself
enmeshed with the Palestinians. The FLQ also self-destructed with its
wanton murder of Laporte, a senseless act that disgusted Quebecers. Above
all, there were alternative, peaceful means of expression available for
sovereignist sentiment. The PQ had just entered the National Assembly in
Quebec elections earlier the same year. Force could be used successfully
against illegitimate force when legitimate channels existed.
Does the successful outcome of the affair offer retroactive
justification to a government that in effect put liberal freedoms on hold and
declared that the end justified the means? There are perhaps two answers
to this question, and each has significance for how we understand the
response of the government of Canada to 9/11.
First, it must be clearly stated that the Trudeau government during
and after October 1970 was less than frank in its justification of its actions
before Parliament and the public.9 There was no apprehended insurrection:
the failure of the government to follow up with supporting evidence for its
claim in invoking wartime emergency powers was telling, for there was no
such evidence, or at least nothing compelling. Moreover, the advice of the
RCMP would have been against using emergency powers-if its officials had
been consulted, which they were not. The government's retroactive
justification leaned heavily on the alleged shortcomings of the intelligence
on the terrorist groups provided by the security service that supposedly left
them no choice but to round up all the usual suspects and sort them later.
This official rationale was revealed to be seriously distorted when
documents on intelligence reports on the FLQ and other separatist groups
were declassified later.10 The distortions are unfair to the RCMP, which had
in fact done a competent job of penetrating and reporting on violent
separatist groups. They also constitute a reprehensible example of blaming
the servants for the masters' misdeeds. The RCMP had even delivered a very
clear warning in the summer of 1970 that the FLQ had adopted kidnappings
9Leading figures, even in retrospect, were evasive in their justifications. Immediately after the
crisis, a prominent Quebec minister in the Trudeau government, G6rard Pelletier, published a memoir,
La Crise d'Octobre (Montr6al: Editions du Jour, 1971). In Mr. Trudeau's own memoirs, his account of
the affair raises many questions of both fact and interpretation: Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Memoirs
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993) at 128-52.
10
Reg Whitaker, "Apprehended Insurrection? RCMP Intelligence and the October Crisis" (1993)
100:2 Queen's Quarterly 383.
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as their priority tactic, and even specified diplomats and Cabinet ministers
as their likely targets. Yet the warnings were ignored, and potential targets
left unprotected at the tragic cost of Laporte's life. The lesson here is one
often repeated in modern history: intelligence failures are as often failures
of governments to listen to their intelligence as of intelligence professionals
failing to provide.
The RCMP believed that the crisis was essentially a criminal matter,
to be solved by good, careful, patient police work. That was how, in the end,
James Cross was liberated, and it might have saved Laporte's life. Instead,
the government, or at least the Prime Minister and his close Cabinet
associates from Quebec (who in every instance of debate in Cabinet proved
to be the hawks), disingenuously citing an exaggerated threat they knew to
be false, chose to perform a coup de thiatre, a striking demonstration of the
power of the federal government and the futility of violent resistance to it.
From a liberal standpoint, the October Crisis offers a salutary warning
about how the state can lie and use pretexts to aggrandize its power and
crush opposition. From a Machiavellian standpoint, Trudeau skillfully
manipulated a crisis not of his making to effect an end that was in the
national interest.
Choosing between these alternative assessments is not easy. It is
difficult to justify the Trudeau government's actions in misrepresenting
facts and in shifting blame. On the other hand, a terrorist avenue that might
have turned Quebec into an Ulster-style battleground was avoided and the
constitutional avenue for the sovereignty movement opened. Moreover,
despite dire predictions at the time that the fabric of liberal democracy had
suffered irreparable harm from the arbitrary actions taken in 1970, the
evidence suggests otherwise. As a long term result of the crisis and its
aftermath, the War MeasuresAct was later repealed and replaced with an
emergency powers statute11 that is much more measured and balanced. As
a direct consequence of the post-crisis countering of the violent separatists
by unlawful and improper means, the McDonald Commission
recommendations led to the removal of the Security Service from the RCMP
and the creation of a civilian agency; csis has a specific legal mandate for
what it is authorized and not authorized to do, and elaborate mechanisms
of accountability, oversight, and review attached to its operations. These
are very positive gains for liberal democracy, which derive, paradoxically,
from the violations of liberal democracy practised during the crisis. History,
it should be remembered, does not always move in straight lines.

11 EmergenciesAct, R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.).
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III. KEEPING UP WITH THE NEIGHBOURS? AFTER 9/11
The war on terrorism differs from the two historical precedents in
a number of particulars, despite certain dja vu elements. Most
significantly, 9/11 constituted a violent attack on American civil society,
indeed the attacks appear to have been designed to spread fear throughout
all levels of American life. Moreover, the targets have been publicly
designated in A1-Qaeda pronouncements as any and all Americans, not
limited to state officials, military/security personnel, or corporate
executives, as was the case with some earlier terrorist groups. The Cold
War was only weakly felt as constituting a threat to the personal security of
ordinary North Americans in their homes and families. The subversive
threat of the Communist enemy within was largely a constructed
abstraction that waxed briefly in the early, anxious, days of the Cold War,
and then waned by the middle of the 1950s, when an uneasy stability took
hold in East-West relations. The material threat to ordinary people in the
Cold War was the spectre of nuclear holocaust, but this actually turned out
to be a powerful factor pushing governments toward negotiating differences
with the enemy and reducing the possibility of war. The diffuse threat of
post-9/11 terrorism, on the other hand, works decisively in the opposite
direction, putting popular pressure on government to defeat and eliminate
the terrorists, at whatever cost.
The war on terrorism is thus a more populist struggle than the Cold
War, which was always primarily a matter of concern to states and state
elites. The danger of populist authoritarianism is very real to vulnerable
minorities-in this case, the Muslim and Arab communities-and to the
fabric of liberal democracy. States will no doubt always attempt to seize the
opportunities offered by major security crises to enhance their coercive
powers at the expense of individual and groups rights. When they have deep
and enduring popular support in exploiting such opportunities, the longterm result promises to be bleaker from a civil libertarian point of view.
9/11 was, however, not just an attack on civil society, but in the first
instance, an attack onAmerican civil society. As a liberal, capitalist, 'infidel'
democracy allied closely to the United States, Canada is obviously
implicated as a target of radical Islamist terror. The apparently authentic
statement issued by Osama bin Laden in the fall of 2002 specifically
threatened Canada along with other Western states associated with the
United States. As primary targets are hardened by tough security measures,
it is always possible that softer targets will be sought by the terrorists, even
in other countries. Nonetheless, it was evident from 9/11 that America is
the primary focus of terrorist wrath, and Canada is at best a secondary,
peripheral target. The attacks on the twin towers of global capitalism and
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the headquarters of U.S. military might were brilliantly chosen for the
spectacular symbolism encoded in the acts. Attacks on the cn Tower and
the Defence headquarters in Ottawa would send an indecipherable message
to the world.
Canadians instinctively sympathized with Americans, shared their
12
pain and anger, and continue to support the idea of a war on terrorism.
Despite the successful coalition-building activity of the U.S. administration
around the invasion of Afghanistan, and the rather less enthusiastically
received efforts around a projected war on Iraq, Canadians have tended to
see the war on terrorism as primarily an American, rather than a
multilateral, struggle. President Bush's pointed omission of Canada from
his otherwise exhaustive list of countries officially thanked, and his offhand
dismissal of the need to offer any apology for the four Canadian soldiers
killed by American friendly fire in Afghanistan, were widely perceived in
Canada as insults. They also confirmed the specifically American nature of
the war on terrorism, and Canada's distinctly auxiliary role in the conflict.
Public opinion analysis suggests that Canadians, like much of the rest of the
world, have actually grown more distant from the United States, and more
critical of American leadership, since 9/11.13
Analysis of the policy response of the Canadian government to 9/11
suggests that Canada has actually been fighting a war on two fronts. One
front is the public face of the war on terrorism: Canada fulfills its
obligations as an ally in the broad coalition against terrorist movements and
reassures its own citizens that it is doing what it can to protect their safety.
The second front, less publicly acknowledged, is essentially damage
limitation: not in relation to terrorist acts, but in relation to the potential
12 There are a number of polls that have shown that Canadian support for the war on terrorism,
and the Afghan intervention, has remained strong. For instance, EKOS reported in August 2002 that

three out of five Canadians supported Canadian military participation in Afghanistan, while only one
in five were opposed. See "September 1 1 h in Hindsight, Recovery and Resolve" online: EKOS Research
Associates <http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/9sept2002.pdf> at 22,23 (date accessed: 18 May 2003).

Gallup reported in September 2002 that sixty-one per cent of Canadians approved of the U.S. conduct
of the war on terrorism. An invasion of Iraq was received much less enthusiastically. In January 2003,

Ipsos-Reid found that only fifteen per cent of Canadians would support Canadian participation in an
Iraq war without UN sanction, less than the eighteen per cent who were opposed to any war, with or
without UN sanction. See "A Special Report: Attacking Iraq" online: Ipsos-Reid <http://www.ipsosreid.com/media/dspdisplaypr.prnt.cfm?ID-to-view= 1711 >(date accessed: 18 May 2003).
13
Ayear after9/11, CRIC (Centre for Research and Information on Canada) reported a dramatic
turnaround: thirty-five per cent of the population wanted Canadian ties to the United States to be
"more distant", an increase of twnety-two points over October 2001; twenty-eight per cent of the
population wanted closer ties to the United States, a decrease of five points over October 2001. See
"More Canadians Distance Themselves From U.S. Neighbours" online: Centre for Research and
Information on Canada <http://www.crie.ca/pdf/cric_poll/borderlines ca us/borderlines_press
neighbours sept2002.pdf>(date accessed: 18 May 2003).
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collateral economic harm to Canadian interests caused by the U.S.
interpretation of national security on its northern border. U.S. homeland
security will be protected, either at the Canada-U.S. border or around a
wider North American perimeter. If security is imposed along the border,
it will be at an economic cost unacceptable to Canada, which sends more
than eighty-five per cent of its exports to the United States. The costs would
also be high to the United States, but loom proportionately less on the
American side; moreover, the Bush administration is willing to pay very
high economic costs for security, including the $158 billion U.S. federal
deficit incurred in 2002.
Faced with a formidable big business lobby insistent on reopening
the border for unimpeded commerce, at whatever political cost, 4 the
Canadian government confronted an unsettling policy alternative: a North
American security perimeter in which Canadian sovereignty would be
seriously threatened by pressures to harmonize its rules on entry-given the
balance of power between the two countries, this would inevitably mean
wholesale adoption of American standards. The Canadian policy dilemma
on the second front has been how to reassure the United States sufficiently
on border security so that commercial traffic can be maintained, while not
surrendering a critical degree of Canadian sovereignty in the process.
The two fronts are interrelated. Everything that Canada contributes
to the war on terrorism, and to maintain strong security against terrorism
within Canada, tends to relieve U.S. pressure on the border. The Canadian
first front response has involved: more resources for security and
intelligence; a streamlined security decision-making structure within the
federal government at both the political and bureaucratic levels; new and
expanded legal powers for anti-terrorist law enforcement and investigation;
and closer coordination and sharing of information with allies.15 All of these
have helped maintain Canadian economic security by reassuring the U.S.
that Canada is enforcing adequate security standards on its own. However,
they have not been enough.

14 Coalition for Secure & Trade-Efficient Borders, Rethinking our Borders: a Plan for Action (3
December 2001); Presentation of Thomas D'Aquino, President and Chief Executive (January 14,2003)

"Security and Prosperity: The Dynamics of a New Canada-United States Partnership in North
America", to the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Toronto,
online: <http://www.ceocouncil.ca/English/Publications/reports/janl4-03.pdf> (date accessed: 18 May

2003).
15 Reg Whitaker, "More or Less Than Meets the Eye? The New National Security Agenda", in
Bruce Doern, ed., How Ottawa Spends 2003104 [forthcoming 2003].
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Parallel to this track, Canada has taken another series of initiatives
under the rubric of the Smart Border agreements. 16 These initiatives involve
a series of ongoing negotiations with the United States on such matters as
pre-clearance of container traffic at the point of origin; fast-tracking of safe
persons and goods; collection and retention of a wide range of data on
persons traveling by air across the border; the application of high-tech
surveillance equipment along the border; expansion of Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams; and, controversially, a "safe third country" agreement
to reduce the flow of refugees across the border. Despite some inevitable
glitches, these negotiations have so far been largely successful, in the view
of U.S. Homeland Security secretary Tom Ridge, who has warmly stressed
the usefulness of their further expansion. Critics in Canada, from those on
the political right who have characterized these measures as too little, too
late, to those on the nationalist left who have tended to see them as sellouts
of sovereignty, have unanimously missed the point of the Canadian
strategy. The Canadian government has tried to avoid being trapped into
sweeping negotiations on a mega-agreement over a Fortress North
America-such as the perimeter security project proffered by Paul Cellucci,
the United States Ambassador to Canada, just after 9/11 (and endorsed by
a number of provincial premiers, the Official Opposition in Ottawa, and the
influential Council of Canadian Chief Executives). Instead, the Canadian
government has engaged the Americans in a series of incremental
negotiations, segmented but linked, the successful outcome of which have
had the cumulative effect of mollifying American security concerns, while
keeping the flow of cross-border commerce more or less intact. Absorbed
in the specifics, the U.S. negotiators have lost sight of the larger picture,
which is exactly to the taste of the Canadian negotiators who wished to
minimize the larger loss of sovereignty necessarily entailed in any grander,
macro-level integration and harmonization project.
Although the Canadian federal government has shown considerable
skill and adroitness in managing the second front of this two-front war, it
is a volatile process subject to unpredictable upsets. Certain politicians and
journalists in the United States allude frequently to the alleged security risk
to America posed by lax Canadian security policies and a lamentably
undefended northern border. An imagined Canadian connection to 9/11
was doggedly investigated, but all leads came up empty. In fact, the U.S.
16 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ("dfait"), The Canada-U.S.Smart
BorderDeclaration, online: DFAIT <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorismldeclaration-e.asp> (date
accessed: 18 May 2003) . DFAIT News Release, "Manley and Ridge Release Progress Report on the
Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan" (28 June 2002), online: DFAIT <http://webapps.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpee=/MinPub Does/105343.htm&bPrint=False&Year>
(date accessed: 18 May 2003).
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State Department in its official report tracking global terrorist trends for
the year 2001 explicitly denied any Canadian connection and went on to
describe Canadian co-operation in anti-terrorism as a model the U.S. would
like to see practised with its other allies. t7 Yet as late as January 2003, five
mysterious "Arabs" who had allegedly entered the United States from
Canada were the subject of an all-points terrorist alarm, endorsed by no
less than President Bush. Within a few days, the story collapsed, revealed
as a hoax. Nonetheless, despite an angry demand from Canadian
Immigration minister Denis Coderre, New York Senator Hilary Clinton
refused to apologize for her claim that the non-existent suspects had
entered the United States via Canada. 18 The Canadian connection stories
have proved to have about the same credibility as the episode of the TV
series The West Wing, in which the White House was alerted to a terrorist
who had infiltrated across the Ontario-Vermont border. Although no
responsible official of the U.S. government has ever given credence to this
mythology, anti-Canadian suspicions form a political background to
American perceptions of Canada that Canadian officials are persistently
forced to confront.
In fact, there is very little evidence that Canadian security is any less
vigilant than that of America. Canadian and American authorities share
common databases on the bad guys; exchange intelligence on a regular,
indeed institutionalized, basis; and cooperate closely on cross-border
enforcement. 9 If there was any performance gap in the past, it was in
enforcement and was attributable not to lower Canadian standards, but
simply to fewer resources available to the Canadians relative to their U.S.
counterparts. That gap was closing even prior to 9/11. Certainly, it has been
reduced since the national security budget in early 2002, which allocated
$49 million of new funding to immigration and border enforcement and
over $110 million to security and intelligence agencies.
Despite these facts, there are influential forces in Canada always
ready to reinforce American suspicions: the Canadian Alliance and its
successive leaders; some provincial ministers; the NationalPost, Southam
17 The pre-9/11 case most cited by critics is that of Ahmed Ressam, apprehended in late
1999
attempting to enter the United States at Port Angeles, Washington, on his way to play a part in a
planned millennium terror attack on the L.A. Airport. Yet in 2001, U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft brushed off critics of Canadian security by insisting that in this case the United States had
acted on information provided by Canadian authorities, with whom cooperation was "outstanding";
interview of John Ashcroft (4 December 2001) on CTV News, CTV Television.
18 Sheldon Alberts, "Clinton refuses Ottawa's call for apology" The NationalPost, January 10,
2003.
Reg Whitaker, "Refugee Policy After September 11: Not Much New" (2001) 20:4
Refuge 29.
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Press, Global and CTV News; and certain so-called terrorist experts. They
have all relentlessly endorsed the idea that Canada is a haven for terrorists,
where feeble security enforcement and loose social liberalism combine to
provide a haven and base for terrorists threatening the United States. The
existence of a cadre of serial confessors eager to assert Canadian
responsibility for American security and intelligence failures is a curious
feature of the Canadian political culture, even a subject for satire by a
columnist in the principal offending newspaper, the NationalPost.20 It has
not made the task of the government any easier in managing an already
delicate two-front campaign.
A more serious challenge to Canadian sovereignty is the widespread
and influential support voiced by business lobbies, think tanks, and even the
parliamentary committee on foreign affairs and international trade,2 that
Canada should seize the opportunity offered by 9/11 to think big and
negotiate a much wider ranging arrangement for North American economic
integration (including all, or some, of a customs union, a common labour
market, adoption of the American currency). Opinion on this is divided
between advocates who see a window of opportunity in the 9/11 security
crisis, and opponents, some of whom are opposed in principle to
integration, but all of whom see more dangers than opportunities in any
deals made with an American administration in a highly unilateralist and
nationalistic mood post 9/11. For a Liberal government preoccupied with
managing Canadian-American relations on a range of touchy security
issues, including military contributions to a war with Iraq, the prospect of
entering onto the mine-laden field of comprehensive negotiations for a
NAFTA Plus, can hardly seem appealing. Whether it can be avoided is
another matter.
The prospect is mentioned here only to demonstrate that 9/li's
impact on Canada is by no means straightforward. Nor was the impact of
the Cold War. Indeed, on the matter of Canadian sovereignty in North
America, there is considerable continuity between the Cold War and the
war on terrorism. Both crises extended quickly from the security sphere to
the economic sphere, and from there to the political and cultural
dimensions of Canadian nationhood. In neither case, however, does a
purely nationalist reading make much sense. It is not a question of U.S.
hegemony versus Canadian resistance. Rather, the lines are drawn within
20 Paul Wells, "Thousands die - blame Canada" The NationalPost (18 December, 2001) A6.
21 House of Commons, Partnersin North America: Advancing Canada'sRelations with the United

States and Mexico, Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(December 2002), online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/FAIT/PressReleases/FAITpr2e.htm> (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
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Canada, as they were during the Cold War, between those advocating
greater integration with the United States and greater support for the
American international position, and those wishing to limit that support
and insisting on skepticism toward greater integration as a by-product of
security co-operation. The latter camp must come to terms with the reality
that there is underlying public support for the general stance of CanadianAmerican co-operation. During the Cold War, Canadians generally agreed
that the Communist bloc represented the chief security threat and accepted
American leadership in contesting Communism as appropriate. In the
current crisis, Canadian opinion accepts that terrorism is the major security
threat and supports Canadian participation, under American leadership, in
confronting terrorism. Neither then nor now does this mean Canadian
support for all aspects of American leadership, or a willingness to follow
the United States down any path-especially one entered upon in a
unilateral fashion that ignores the United Nations and multilateral
relationships. Yet underlying support, along with the inescapable economic
realities of the existing degree of economic integration, limits the scope of
open criticism of U.S. leadership and places Canadian governments in the
position of negotiating degrees of integration, rather than allowing the
liberty of asking whether greater integration ought to take place.
In 1965, George Grant published Lament for a Nation, in which he
blamed the Liberal elites of the day for the demise of Canada, while
nonetheless insisting on the inevitability of the end of nationhood. In the
early 21st century, with another war replacing the Cold War that was
Grant's despair, the role of the Liberal elites remains ambiguous and
subject to varying interpretations, although this time there is more criticism
of them as anti-American than as pro-American. The contradiction in
Grant points to a paradox in both instances: in the face of powerful
structural forces favouring integration and the decline of sovereignty, the
Liberal elites are neither integrationist nor nationalist, rather they are
negotiators of a persistently difficult passageway between pressures to go
too far and pressures to go not far enough.
Critics of government security policy after 9/11 have charged that
the anti-terrorist legislative changes brought before Parliament are largely
a result of pressures to keep up with the neighbours. Indeed, among these
critics is the former Director of Csis, Reid Morden. 22 Yet on closer
examination, there is rather less than meets the eye in this charge. Canada
was indeed forced to legislate specifically in response to an American policy
decision, in the case of federal aviation regulations demanding advance
22 Reid Morden, "Finding the right balance" (2002) 23:06 Policy Options 45-8.
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production of a range of personal data on passengers arriving from abroad
at U.S. airports. Canada had no choice in this matter, short of losing
landing rights for Canadian carriers, even though this American policy did
necessitate overriding Canadian privacy law.
Beyond this instance, direct response to American pressure is more
difficult to pin down. Certainly some indirect pressure may have been
applied on Canada to comply with a generally more stringent anti-terrorist
regime that was falling into place after 9/11. In its centerpiece AntiTerrorism Act, 3 Canada felt compelled to join in the multilateral antiterrorist campaign by, for instance, developing a legal definition of
terrorism that conformed to definitions in various international texts, and
in defining terrorist entities under Canadian law and listing them for the
purposes of blocking the financing of terrorism, in conformity with
international efforts sanctioned by the UN. With regard to stepped-up
electronic surveillance powers-a key feature of American anti-terrorist
legislation-the Anti- TerrorismAct is silent, except for an accompanying
promise that Canada would develop legislation in conformity with the
EuropeanConvention on Cyber Crime.24 This promise is now in the process
of enactment with the Justice Department's public consultation on lawful
access?5 Analysis of the Anti- TerrorismAct, as well as the proposed Public
Safety Act, discloses little that can be seen as directly responding to
specifically American demands, as such, or reflecting American provisions
and practices.
Upon reflection, it is not difficult to discern why the relationship
between American and Canadian legislative initiatives is relatively weak.
While the terrorist threat may be similar in all Western countries, each
country has its own unique set of political institutions and processes, its own
legal traditions, and its own specific political forces in play.
The United Kingdom, with a long history of confronting Irish
Republican terrorism in Britain, already had a very strong, in cases
draconian, security legislation in place, in the form of successive Prevention
of Terrorism Acts. Interestingly, one new power sought by the UK
23 S.C. 2001, c. 41. Even before its final passage, this legislative package received extraordinary
academic attention in a book of essays, most ofwhich were critical: Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem,
& Kent Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada'sAnti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2001). See also Erroll P. Mendes & Debra M. McAllister, eds., Between
Crime and War: Terrorism, Democracy and the Constitution, (2002) 14:1 N.J.C.L.

24 ETS No. 185, Budapest, November 23, 2001.
25 Department of Justice Canada, Lawful Access - Consultation Document (25 August 2002):
online: Departmentof JusticeCanada <http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/laal/> (date accessed:
18 May 2003).
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government was the deportation of persons suspected of terrorist
associations to their places of origin, even in cases where this might entail
returning a refugee to the country of their persecution, thus violating the
un Convention on Refugees.' This power was not sought by the Canadian
government, and was specifically brought into question post-9/11 by the
Supreme Court in the case of Suresh"
The most striking divergence in practice, although not clearly in
law, between Canada and the United States and United Kingdom post-9/1 1,
has been the indefinite detention in the latter two countries of non-citizens
on suspicion of terrorist associations. The Court of Appeal in the United
Kingdom has agreed that foreign terror suspects can be held in United
Kingdom jails indefinitely without trial. There was an initial round of
detentions in the United States just after 9/11, numbering somewhat over
1,000 (the exact figures have never been released), and sporadic detentions
have taken place subsequently. The USA PATRIOT Act 2s as drafted by the
Justice Department originally called for the power of indefinite detention
of non-citizens on suspicion. This power proved controversial, however, and
Congress insisted upon time limits on detention of seven days before cause
had to be shown. The executive, relying on loopholes in the legislation, has
detained non-citizens indefinitely, without legal representation. Various
devices have been invoked, including the holding of suspects as material
witnesses, normally used with regard to grand jury investigations, but in
these cases leaving the question "material witnesses to what?" unanswered.
This behaviour appears to demonstrate contempt for Congress, yet has
elicited remarkably little criticism from that body. Nor has the issue of the
constitutionality of the executive's actions been effectively challenged in the
courts, although various challenges have yet to arrive at the final level of
appeal in the Supreme Court. The issue of the treatment of non-citizens in
the United States has been skewed by the administration's decision to treat
foreign terrorists as enemy combatants, subject to military law outside the
normal Geneva Convention rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. In
two cases, the same treatment has been accorded U.S. citizens suspected of
Al-Qaeda activities. To this point, the courts have upheld the
administration's right to hold citizens indefinitely without legal

26Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (U.K.), 2001, c. 24, ss. 21-22.
Audrey Macklin, "Mr. Suresh and the Evil Twin" (2002) 20:4 Refuge 15.

27

28 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOTAct).
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representation and without judicial review.29 In this latter instance, there
are grave consequences for the constitutional rights of American citizens,
a situation that has drawn strong criticism from at least some legal and
journalistic quarters.
In Canada, indefinite detention on suspicion is not practised. Noncitizens subject to removal on security grounds are sometimes detained, a
practice that predates 9/11. However, these persons are not denied
representation and the Crown must show cause in court. The 1984 Supreme
Court of Canada decision in the case of Singh would appear to raise an
effective barrier against a general practice of differential treatment of non30 If the United
citizens as falling outside the protection of the Charter.
States had been insistent upon harmonization of North American
immigration security rules, or if Canada had believed it necessary to
conform to American practice on detentions in order to keep cross-border
commerce flowing, the federal government might have been faced with
having to invoke the notwithstanding clause to override the effect of Singh.
Although such an action would no doubt have been approved by the same
lobby that has been pushing in Canada for a more integrated perimeter
security arrangement, the government has never even hinted that such an
action was being contemplated. In short, U.S. pressure has been negligible
on this issue.
During the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act, considerable
controversy was generated by provisions for preventive arrest and
investigative hearings; both were ultimately subjected to a sunset clause.
Preventive arrest is strictly limited to forty-eight hours, although refusal to
comply with terms of recognizance could result in imprisonment. At all
times, however, a person held under preventive arrest is fully represented.
Investigative hearings appear to be modeled to a degree on the U.S. grand
jury system, but even where a person brought before such a hearing could
be compelled to testify against others, Charter protection against selfincrimination is explicitly recognized. Under questioning by a parliamentary
committee in June, 2002, a senior Justice Department official
acknowledged that neither of these extraordinary powers had by that date

29 These are the cases of Yasser Esam Hamdi, one of the enemy combatants captured in
Afghanistan who turned out to have been American-born, and Jos6 Padilla, the so-called dirty bomb
suspect. Both cases continue through the legal appeal process, but in the case of Hamdi a federal
appeals court ruled in early 2003 that in wartime the state can indefinitely detain a United States citizen
captured as an enemy combatant on the battlefield and deny that person access to a lawyer: Neil A.
Lewis, "US Is Allowed to Hold Citizen as Combatant" New York Times (January 9, 2003).
30
Singh et al v. Canada (Ministerof Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
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actually been invoked, 3t and there have been no subsequent reports of their
use.

If this pattern persists, it will echo a precedent set in during the
early Cold War, when a series of amendments were made adding offences
and stiffening penalties in the Criminal Code for treason, sabotage, and
sedition-all of which are linked to the Cold War threat of Communism.
Critics at the time suggested, without evidence, that these changes had been
initiated by American pressures. If so, pressure had been fruitless: no
Communist or Communist sympathizer was ever charged under the
amended provisions, which lay dormant for almost two decades, until the
October 1970 Crisis, when a seditious conspiracy provision was dusted off
and used against five people accused of being associated with the FLQ,
newly banned under the War Measures Act. All such charges failed in
court.32 There is thus some precedent for tough sounding legislative actions
that prove to be more symbolic than substantive in intention.
The main reason for downplaying American pressures as a basis of
Canadian legislation is that a great deal of the Anti-TerrorismAct is not
directly related to 9/11 at all, but answers to wider and deeper issues
surrounding the legal and institutional framework for national security
policy. Among the non-9/11 related elements of the Anti-TerrorismAct:
*
The Official Secrets Act is replaced by a new Security of
InformationAct, including new offences, such as economic
espionage;
•
The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the
electronic eavesdropping agency, is for the first time given
a statutory mandate, with its powers and limitations spelled
out, and with an important additional power to retain
Canadian communications related to terrorism (this is 9/11
related);
*
Serious limitations are imposed on the Access to
Information, Privacy, and Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Acts with regard to disclosure
and retention of information relating to national security;
and
31

Testimony of Richard Mosley, Assistant Deputy Minister, Criminal Law Policy, Department
of Justice (June 10, 2002), to the House of Commons Sub-Committee on National Security, online:

<http://www.parl.gc.ca/nfoComDoc/37/l/SNAS/Meetings/Evidence/snasevO5-e.htm#lnt-278274>
(date accessed: 18 May 2003).
32 M.L. Friedland, National Security: the Legal Dimensions, study prepared for the Royal
Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the RCMP (Ottawa: 1979) 22-30; Cold War
Canada, supra note 2 at 197-204.
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Provisions regarding non-disclosure of sensitive national
security evidence serve mainly to Charter-proof existing
evidence provisions following the Stinchcombe decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada.33
34
Taken together with the CanadianSecurity Intelligence Service Act
and the Security Offences Act35 of 1984 (the latter now augmented byAn Act
toAmend the ForeignMissions and InternationalOrganizationsAct)36 and the
Immigration and Refugee ProtectionAct, 37 the last two passed just prior to
9/11 and the latter itself amended by C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act
constitutes the basis for comprehensive Canadian national security
legislation, which will be further augmented when the Public Safety Act
finally becomes law. The opportunity offered by 9/11 was alertly seized by
the Canadian security and intelligence community, which has ended up with
much more than it would likely have achieved had 9/11 not happened. But
most of these ideas for change were already in the pipeline in Ottawa,
sometimes for years, awaiting the political push that would bring them to
the front of the policy agenda. The push came from Al-Qaeda, not from the
United States. The specifics of Canada's national security policy regime
owes little to the model of the U.S. system; indeed, on many important
points, it differs sharply from their American neighbours.38
Nor does Canada show enthusiasm for emulating the Americans in
another particular: the targeting of the Muslim minority as a threat to
security. Both governments began shortly after 9/11 by saying all the right
things that would steer the majority away from the kind of ethnic
victimization of the Japanese communities that occurred in both countries
during World War II. In both countries, the objective effect of security
policies has amounted to ethnic profiling of Muslims in practice. From a
policing and security perspective, the targeting of high risk people simply
represents the effective direction of resources; from the perspective of
33R v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R 326, ordered the production in court of criminal intelligence
relevant to the defence. Stinchcombe was a criminal case and its relevance to national security cases was
unclear. The evidence provisions in C-36 are in the spirit of better safe than sorry.

34 R.S.C. 1985, c. 23 (note: pending amendment not in force, S.C. 2001, c.27, ss.223-226).
35 R.S.C. 1985, s. S-7.
36 S.C. 2002, c.
12.
37
S.C. 2002, c. 27.
38 A notable example of institutional difference is the debate that has opened in Washington since
9/11 about the desirability of splitting the fbi into a counter-terrorist intelligence agency and an
institutionally separate criminal law enforcement body. In Canada, this was done in 1984 with the csis
Act separating the security service from the RCMP.
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those flagged for particular attention, the policy represents ethnic and
religious victimization. In the us, apparent anti-Muslim bias in government
policy is becoming increasingly public. Although targeting has focused on
non-citizens, the line between aliens and Muslim-Americans is increasingly
blurred, or so it is perceived to be by Muslim-Americans. The requirement
for all aliens from listed Muslim countries to register with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service
has sent a deep chill through the entire Muslim39
community.
American
The targeting of people born in certain so-called high-risk Muslim
countries attempting to enter the United States-and their subsequent
special treatment, including interrogation and fingerprinting-has raised
official protests from Canada regarding Canadian citizens whose treatment
on arrival at American entry points seems to be discrimination on the basis
of their country of birth.40 Canada does practise effective ethnic profiling
in its own anti-terrorist security measures, but it typically does so in a more
guarded, less public manner than the Americans. This is a parallel to the
McCarthy era in the United States during the early Cold War, when
Canadians somewhat smugly congratulated themselves on avoiding the
excesses of Communist witch hunting in the United States, while at the
same time doing some of the same things behind closed doors. Yet it is the
very public singling out of Muslims that sets off alarm bells among minority
communities at risk in the United States, while these same groups tend to
feel less threatened in Canada. In an eerie parallel to the Cold War, when
threatened leftists, especially in academe, fled across the border to find
safer havens in Canada, there were reports in early 2003 of Muslims from
the United States seeking refuge in Canada.4"
IV.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Canada's response to 9/11 does indicate that keeping up with the
neighbours is, to a degree, an important guide to public policy. Like the
Cold War, the war on terrorism is a multilateral effort under American
leadership. As a participant in the alliance, Canada has to do many things
to keep up its part. However, most of these things it would have done on its
own, both to assure an anxious public concerned about threats to their
39American Civil Liberties Union, Press release: "Immigrant Registration
Program Pretext for
Mass Detentions" (December 19, 2002).
40
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41 Michael Powell, "Pakistanis Flee to Canada and
Uncertainty: Families Uprooted By INS
Deadline" The Washington Post (January 18, 2003) A01.
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security, and to pre-empt the Americans from taking more drastic measures
that would directly threaten Canadian sovereignty. Ottawa recognizes that
important, and influential, sections of the Canadian business, political, and
media elites constantly push for greater integration with the United States
and greater harmonization of Canadian policies with U.S. policies, and that
these pressures are more influential than usual during times of
international crisis and high insecurity. At the same time, Canadian public
opinion demands some distance from the appearance that Canadian policy
is being dictated from Washington. This latter tendency is heightened when
the U.S. leadership is perceived by many in Canada as immoderate and
potentially dangerous, which seems to be the case today.
As historical precedents, the Cold War and the October 1970 Crisis
demonstrate that Canada is capable of acting forcefully, and with relatively
few restraints, in dealing with a perceived threat from within linked to a
threat from without. The anti-terrorism legislation and the shift in
resources towards national security enforcement in the wake of 9/11 come
as no surprise. Yet the historical precedents are double-edged. If they
suggest a capacity for repressive and illiberal actions in the name of
national security, it is also the case that the long-term result of both of these
crises was to strengthen liberal democracy and the protection of civil
liberties, as a direct consequence of revulsion generated by repressive and
unaccountable state actions. This too is part of the historical background
to the present crisis. Canadians have learned from experience about the
consequences of overreaction. There is a space between the Canadian and
American responses, partly generated by the direction of the terrorist
threat primarily against the United States, and partly generated by
differences in the political cultures. This space allows Canadians some
critical distance, some room to develop made-in-Canada policies, and some
capacity to resist American pressures-especially when these pressures
come in the form of unilateralist, America First, imperatives. Canada is
always more comfortable keeping up with the neighbours when this is a
multilateral enterprise.

